

**01114**

**1972/11/24**

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

PARIS TALKS

1. Some improvements granted by other side, including more satisfactory statement on status of DMZ. Other side held firm that there would be only minor changes in the political chapter and no improvements whatsoever in the text of the agreement with respect to issue of their troops in South Viet-Nam.

2. In return for minor changes in the political chapter and release of political prisoners, other side would make commitment to relocate some of the forces in MR 1 and to bring ceasefire in Laos closer to the time of ceasefire in South Viet-Nam.

3. Both arrangements will be in the form of understandings rather than written commitments. Le Duc Tho indicated that if we meet their demands on prisoners and the political chapter, they would give an appropriate response on the number of troops that would be relocated.

4. Options which Dr. Kissinger feels are now open to us:

- a) Break off talks at next meeting.
- b) Insist on the original positions on the political prisoners held by the GVN, giving it ability to negotiate with the VC for their release; attempt to obtain minor change in the political

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provisions along lines of GVN request; insist on demobilization of Vietnamese forces specifying this is to be done on a one for one basis by both sides. This would be combined with an understanding that Thieu would release some political prisoners in return for the movement of some North Vietnamese forces from MR 1.

c) Accept essentially no changes in Chapters 3 and 4 beyond minor ones already achieved to include accepting demand for release of political prisoners, but in return demand withdrawal of a substantial number of North Vietnamese troops.

5. It is our view that Option 2 is the most advantageous providing, as it does, for demobilization on a one for one basis and the removal of some North Vietnamese forces from MR 1 in return for the release of some political prisoners.

